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PAYING THE PRICE
FOR
Too BIG TO FAIL
CORNELIUS HURLEY*
"[W]e reiterate our determination to preserve the
viability of systemically important financial institutions so
that they are able to meet their commitments.
I. INTRODUCTION
We find ourselves in an economic crisis, the severity of which few
persons living today have witnessed. Fear, the natural accompaniment of
such crises, arises from our uncertainty about the depth and duration of the
crisis. The consensus is that a restoration of confidence is fundamental to a
recovery. From the eye of the storm, it is difficult to assess the
effectiveness of attempts at quelling its ravages. Yet, we may have little
choice but to begin making those assessments as the architecture of the new
order is being designed now.
The origins of the current crisis are well recorded. 2 Topping the
list of causal factors were a U.S. obsession with housing creation,
unnaturally low interest rates, deregulation of financial and capital markets,
a blind eye by policymakers to correlation risks to the economy, financial
engineering, accounting doctrine, and, of course, the standby for all
economic emergencies, greed. One factor that pulled together elements of
all of these was the presence of several large and complex financial
institutions, each of whose disorderly liquidation would have a disastrous
effect on the financial system and on the real economy. The threat posed
by these institutions to the public interest caused them to be grouped under
the misleading heading "too big to fail" (TBTF). The title is misleading on
the one hand, because it implies that institutions are readily identified as
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'Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Joint Statement by the Treasury, FDIC,
OCC, OTS and the Federal Reserve (Feb. 23, 2009).
2 See generally GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, Too BIG TO FAIL: THE
HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS (Brookings Inst. (2004)).
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falling into this category, and, on the other hand, by the false signal that
size alone matters when, in fact, other characteristics of a firm (complexity,
leverage, interconnectedness) may be what creates the foreboding that
spillover effects from a firm's demise will threaten the economy.
In its response to the current crisis, the federal government has been
adding to the legacy of the inchoate TBTF policy of the U.S., and the
picture has not been pretty and hardly inspiring of much needed confidence.
The bailouts have been so arbitrary, so vague of purpose, and so poorly
communicated that it is little wonder that neither consumers nor markets
have been encouraged. The deficiency of policymakers' response to the
current crisis has been well chronicled, and the purpose of this paper is not
to add to that body of work. Rather, the attempt here is to set forth a new
way forward for dealing with the systemically significant or, as grudgingly
referred to below, TBTF firms. It will be pointed out that the current
reactive policy of "constructive ambiguity" may well be ambiguous but is
hardly constructive. In its place is suggested a more forward-looking
approach that, before the crisis hits, defines and identifies institutions
whose uninsured creditors will be protected. That protection comes at a
cost, however, in the form of informational intimacy with the firms'
constituents and with their regulators. Most significantly, what is called for
is a transfer of the funding advantage such firms enjoy back from whence it
came-the general treasury and the taxpayers.
This new approach, viewed from one perspective, is a radical
departure from a century of U.S. democratic capitalism. From another
perspective, however, it is a logical next step beyond those already taken by
policymakers in response to the current economic crisis. It draws upon the
historical lesson that government support of private institutions comes with
a price, whether that support is explicit or implicit. If we are to tolerate the
continued operation of legal entities whose very size and complexity pose a
risk to the general economic welfare, then the market will identify those
firms with some precision and their competitive advantage, already
considerable due to their scale, will be magnified by the perceived backing
by the government of their uninsured creditors.
II. HOW WE GOT HERE
The causes and conditions that led to the current crisis have been
amply documented. Soft and hard causes are common to many of these
studies. Prominent soft causes identified in the studies are greed and moral
hazard. Common hard causes are the increased size and complexity of
financial services firms in recent decades. In the last three decades,
consolidation and convergence among the firms that constitute what is
customarily regarded as the financial services industry (banking, securities,
and insurance) has produced several firms boasting assets exceeding $1
trillion. The composition of the industry has become less bank-centric
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during this period. In 2006, for example, of the twenty-five largest
financial services firms by revenue, only six were primarily banking firms.
By 2008, nine of the most prominent firms in the industry had either ceased
to exist as independent companies or had changed their business models.3
In 1997, the ten largest banks in the U.S. had 52.7 million deposit accounts.
Ten years later, the single largest bank boasted fifty-four million deposit
accounts.
As if the challenge of managing a leap in the scope and the scale of
these firms was not enough, during this same period there emerged an array
of complex financial products, many of them with roots in the $11 trillion
mortgage market. Mortgage backed securities (government backed and
private label), collateralized debt obligations, and credit default swaps, to
name a few, became part of the product offerings at these firms. As we
now know, these creative products were adopted without either: a) an
understanding by management or boards of directors of how the products
worked, or, b) an elementary risk management system to identify loss
prevention measures and ameliorate the products' hazards.
Congress, policymakers and even the courts encouraged
consolidation, convergence and financial engineering. In particular, Alan
Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board during most of this
period, applauded what he thought was the diversion of risk outside the
supposedly highly-regulated banking system as though nonbanks were a
form of landfill whose toxic contents could not leach back into the banking
system or the economy.5 Little note was taken of the burgeoning risks that
were amassing in the off-balance sheet records of the largest institutions.
When, either for contractual or reputational reasons, these losses were
acknowledged, a massive hole had been created in the institutions' balance
sheets and, just as importantly, in their credibility with investors and
counterparties 6 -a credibility gap that continues .
7
3 These are: AIG, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs Group, Lehman
Brothers Holdings, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Bear Steams, and Countrywide.
4 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking by FDIC on the Processing of Deposit Accounts
in the Event of a Failure, 73 Fed. Reg. 2364, 2369 (proposed Jan. 14, 2008) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 360).
5 Peter Goodman, Taking a Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2008, at Al.
6 Days after Citigroup, Inc. appointed its newest CEO, Vikram Pandit, the bank
took $49 Billion in SIV assets onto its balance sheet. Eric Dash, Big Rescue of
Funds by Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2007, at Cl.
7 Eric Dash, Big Rescue of Funds by Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2007, at Cl
(reporting that days after Citigroup appointed its newest CEO, the bank took $49
billion in S1V assets onto its balance sheet).
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The refrain that the current crisis was "unpredictable" has worn
thin. 8  In many respects, the crisis was not only predictable, it was
unavoidable and foreordained by the very actors who are now downplaying
their own powers of prophecy. Take the case of derivatives, the single most
pervasive and toxic product that contributed to the crisis.
In 1997, Brooksley Born, then chair of the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC), attempted to bring derivative instruments
under the regulatory jurisdiction of the CFTC. 9  She warned that
unregulated trading could pose potentially serious dangers to the
economy.10 She called for greater transparency, and disclosure of trades
and reserves, as a protection against losses. " She was not alone. Years
earlier, the then head of the Government Accountability Office (GAO),
Charles Bowsher, cautioned:
The sudden failure or abrupt withdrawal
from trading of any of these large U.S.
dealers could cause liquidity problems in
the markets and could also pose risks to
others, including federally insured banks
and the financial system as a whole... In
some cases intervention has and could
result in a financial bailout paid for or
guaranteed by taxpayers. 12
Messrs. Rubin, Summers and Greenspan thwarted Ms. Born's
efforts. 13 A year later, disastrous bets on derivatives contributed to the
collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) and the government
orchestrated rescue described below. 14 Finally, in the fall of 2000, with the
nation distracted by the Bush v. Gore saga and well after Ms. Born's
resignation, Congress and the Clinton administration ensured that
derivatives trading would not be threatened again by CFTC oversight by
enacting the Commodity Futures Modernization Act. 15 Guiding this
8 Colin Barr, The Questions Greenspan Didn't Ask, CNNMONEY.COM, Apr. 11,
2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/
04/10/news/newsmakers/greenspan.fortune/index.htm?postversion= 200804 1105.
9 Goodman, supra note 5, at Al.
1° Id.
11Id.
12 Goodman, supra note 5, at Al.
13 Id
14 id.
15 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763 (2000).
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legislation along its way to enactment was Treasury Undersecretary, and
current CFTC chair nominee, Gary Gensler. 16
On November 12, 1999, then President Clinton signed the Gramm
Leach Bliley Act 17 culminating twenty years of lobbying effort, particularly
by the banking and securities industries. The Act kick-started the
convergence of the banking, securities and insurance industries-a process
that was well under way at the time. Key to the Act's passage was general
agreement of all interested parties around the notion of "functional
regulation." Functional regulation assured the concerned industries that
their regulatory relationships would be uninterrupted by the new law. 18 In
sum, functional regulation froze in place regulatory roles and
responsibilities as they existed on that date, notwithstanding the tectonic
scale and scope shifts that were taking place in the financial services
industry.
In a bow to the general awareness that something terribly important
was happening in the financial markets, the Federal Reserve (Fed) was
identified as the "umbrella regulator" without that term ever being
mentioned in the law itself. This seeming banquet of regulatory
responsibility was bestowed on the Fed along with the caution that it should
rely on primary regulators to the extent possible. 19 A more alert Congress
might have been reluctant to bestow this sweeping authority in light of the
Fed's having fallen down on its responsibilities under another important
statute.
Congress enacted the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA) in 199420 in response to evidence of a pattern of abuse in the
subprime mortgage market. The Fed's timid implementation of HOEPA
squandered an opportunity to stunt the growth of the emerging subprime
mortgage market. 2' It is not surprising, therefore, that its exercise of
umbrella supervision was, until the current storm made landfall, timid as
well. Not until 2008, well after the subprime mortgage market had shut
down, did the Fed finalize its HOEPA rules.
Even a vigilant Fed would have had its hands full over the last
decade in light of the risks to the financial system posed by a variety of
firms well outside the shadow of its regulatory umbrella. Alternative
investment vehicles (primarily hedge funds), ratings agencies, and
mortgage brokers were churning out a variety of products and services on
16 Robert Scheer, Obama's Toxic Advisers, THE NATION.COM, Mar. 25, 2009,
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090406 /scheer?rel=hppicks.
17 Gramm Leach Blilely Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
18 id.
19Id.
20 Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108
Stat 2190 (1994).
21 EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES: AMERICA'S LATEST BOOM AND
BUST 28 (URBAN INST. PRESS 2007).
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the periphery, but in plain view, of the financial services industry. Each of
these industry sectors played a fundamental role in the lead up to the
current crisis. It is now well accepted that any comprehensive plan to
reform the regulatory system must include regulation of hedge funds,
ratings agencies, mortgage brokers, and other actors in what has become
known as the "shadow financial system. 22
It should surprise no one that a regulatory structure unable or
unwilling to adapt to shifts in the industry has also proven itself inept at
dealing with the current systemic crisis. Despite periodic warnings,
overreliance on market discipline combined with a flawed regulatory
system led to willful neglect of the problems bubbling beneath the
surface.2 3 Any one of the recent examples, including Continental Illinois,
the savings and loan debacle, or LTCM, should have been sufficient notice
that our tools and methods for dealing with too big to fail firms and
industries were lacking. If nothing else, these events should have taught us
the obvious lesson: "Once a crisis has arisen, financial regulation has
already failed." 
24
III. ADDRESSING A SYSTEMIC CRISIS
Policy reactions to the current crisis have taken three forms:
stimulus, 25 liquidity credit facilities, 26 and capital enhancements of specific
institutions posing risk both to the financial system and to the real
economy. It is difficult to assess what the long-term effects of intervention
with Bear Steams, AIG, Citigroup, Bank of America, Fannie Mae, and
Freddie Mac, or the nonintervention with Lehman Brothers, will be.
However, when measured against the goal of restoration of investor and
public confidence, each has come up short.
22 CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, I 11TH CONG., SPECIAL REPORT ON
REGULATORY REFORM 23 (Comm. Print 2009).
23 See ROBERT E. LITAN & MARTIN N. BAILY, BROOKINGS INST., FIXING FINANCE:
A ROADMAP TO REFORM 18 (2009), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0217_financebailylitan/
0217_ finance bailylitan.pdf.
21 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., supra note 22 at 22.
25 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123
Stat. 115 (2009); Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185, 122 Stat.
613 (2008).
26 A running update of the various facilities introduced and maintained by the
Federal Reserve, Treasury and the FDIC can be found at the Morin Center for
Banking and Financial Law website: http://www.bu.edu/law/morincenter/lectures/
documents/CrisisFacilities_2-10-09copyforformatting.pdf. The update includes
statutory authority, type of facility, expiration date and other useful information for
each facility.
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The legal authority is not always present for intervention with
systemically significant institutions, and, when it is present, is not
necessarily clear. Moreover, no one federal agency is clearly charged with
the authority to act as a systemic regulator, thus forcing the major agencies
and departments (Treasury, Fed, FDIC, FHFA, and SEC) to consult with
one another. The result has been a series of ad hoc interventions that, taken
together: 1) are inconsistent, 2) are expensive to taxpayers, 3) are
inequitable, 4) are ineffective, and, 5) add to the dread that citizens and
markets would like to move beyond.
In this paper, we will lay out exactly what the legal authority is for
government intervention in favor of the uninsured creditors of TBTF
institutions. Next, we will recap how that authority has been used and not
used over the past thirty years with particular attention to the current crisis.
The ensuing discussion will highlight that the difficulty with the current
approach to systemically significant institutions is not just when to
intervene, but how to do so, and to what end. For example, is the
intervention designed to restore the TBTF institution to health, to buy time
for its orderly dismemberment, or merely to keep it functioning so as to do
no further damage to the real economy?
Utilization of the TBTF cudgel has produced a policy mosaic that is
erratic and counterproductive. As a result, a consensus has been emerging
that a new way has to be found for dealing with systemic risk. Although
much of the debate has been around which agency should be responsible for
carrying out the new policy, more serious studies and analysis have devoted
more attention to the philosophical outlines of the new policy. In this
regard, there seems to be overall agreement that, going forward, we have to:
a) identify ex ante with specificity which institutions are systemically
significant, and, b) regulate those institutions in a more rigorous way. This
paper observes that the benefits of being identified as TBTF significantly
outweigh the costs of even the most rigorous regulatory regiment. The net
benefit to the TBTF firm is derived from the taxpayers and needs to be
returned to the taxpayers in the form of an explicit price charged to the
TBTF firm. It is this pricing element that needs to be introduced to the
public dialogue about systemic risk and the TBTF firm.
IV. LAWS RELATED TO SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FAILING
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Throughout the years, legislation enacted for the different
governmental organizations that oversee financial institutions reveals the
government's position about the circumstances in which governmental
intervention is warranted when a systemically significant financial
institution is likely to fail. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act,
the Federal Reserve Act, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act, the Housing Economic Recovery Act and the Emergency
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Economic Stabilization Act are examples of this type of legislation. Each
of these statutes includes provisions on the procedure and standards that the
relevant governmental agency must follow when failing institutions warrant
governmental intervention. The following is a summary of the applicable
TBTF statutes and how the statutes have been utilized.
A. Federal Deposit Insurance Act
The Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 (FDIA) includes the
basic authority for the operation of the FDIC.27 FDIA consolidated all the
earlier Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) legislation into one
Act and revised some other laws. 28 An important provision in the FDIA
was Section 13(c)(2). This section, which was amended later, gave the
FDIC bailout authority, when certain conditions were met. 29 The doctrine
contained in this section was known as the "essentiality doctrine." 30 The
relevant language of Section 13(c)(2) reads:
...when the Corporation has determined
that an insured bank is in danger of
closing, in order to prevent such closing,
the Corporation, in the discretion of its
Board of Directors, is authorized to make
loans to, or purchase the assets of, or make
deposits in, such insured bank, upon such
terms and conditions as the Board of
Directors may prescribe, when in the
opinion of the Board of Directors the
continued operation of such bank is
essential to provide adequate banking
service in the community. (emphasis
added) 31
The standards set by this section required (1) that there is a finding
that the bank is in danger of closing,; and, (2) that the operation of the bank
is essential to the community. 32 Neither the law nor the legislative history
27FDIC, Important Banking Regulation, available at http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/important/index.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2008).
28 Id.
29 IRVINE H. SPRAGUE, BAILOUT, AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF BANK FAILURES AND
RESCUES, 27-29 (1986).301d. at 87.
31 Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, § 13(c), 64 Stat. 873, 888-889 (1950)
(current version at 12 U.S.C.S. § 1823 (2008)) (emphasis added).)
32 Sprague, supra note 29, at 43.
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provided any insight as to how these findings should be made. 33 Moreover,
the law did not include the definition of community or adequate banking
services. 34 Although when Congress passed the law it might have included
the word community with a geographical sense, the word took on a broader
meaning later: groups or constituencies that have common interests. 3 In
practice, the FDIC was reluctant in making a finding of essentiality unless
there was a "clear and present danger to the nation's financial system.
3 6
The law gave the FDIC Board of Directors discretionary authority to make
the findings. 3 However, the statute required that at least two out of the
three directors of the FDIC agree on the findings and the action to pursue. 
38
B. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
In 1991, Congress enacted the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), which included provisions to
address the TBTF problem.39 Until 1991, the FDIC was required to
estimate the cost of a payoff and liquidation as the standard of comparison
and could adopt an alternative resolution if the alternative was expected to
be less costly than the standard. 40 But when the FDIC operated under the
essentiality provision, cost considerations could be disregarded. 41 FDICIA
amended Section 13(c)(2), requiring regulators to close banks using the
least-cost procedure, thus prohibiting the FDIC from granting open-bank
assistance to a failing bank unless its action was cheaper than a closed-bank
resolution.42 The FDIC was required to use the least costly method of
failure resolution, not just less costly. 43 As a result, this provision made it
more "likely that uninsured depositors and creditors will suffer losses when
33 Id.
34 Id.
3 5 Id. at 43.
36 Id. at 28-29. The case of Unity Bank of Boston in 1971 is the exception. In that
case, the FDIC made an essentiality finding based on the interests of the black
community in Roxbury, a neighborhood of Boston.
37 id.
38 Id. at 28-29. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
of 1989 increased the FDIC's Board of Directors to five members by adding a vice
chairman position and the director of the newly formed Office of Thrift
Supervision.
39 Frederic S. Mishkin, How Big a Problem is Too Big to Fail? A Review of Gary
Stern and Ron Feldman 's Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts, 44 J.
ECON. LIT 988, 994 (2006).
40 Lee Davison, Continental Illinois and "Too Big to Fail", HISTORY OF THE
EIGHTIES-LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 244 (FDIC 1997) [hereinafter FDIC
History], available at www.fdic.gov/bank/historica/history/235 258.pdf.
41 Id
42 Id.
43 Stern & Feldman, supra note 2, at 154.
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a bank fails." 44  However, there is an exception to the least-cost
procedure.45 The exception dictates that if the least-cost resolution presents
"serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability," the
FDIC can follow a different action to protect the uninsured creditors and
thereby ameliorate the impact of bank failure on those same economic
conditions and financial stability. 46 FDICIA established the following
procedure: (1) at least two-thirds of the FDIC Board must agree to make a
written recommendation to the Secretary of the Treasury that an exception
to the least-cost procedure is warranted; (2) at least two-thirds of the
Federal Reserve Board must also agree to make the same written
recommendation to the Secretary of the Treasury; and, (3) upon receiving
the recommendation, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
President of the United States, must determine that if the least-cost
procedure was administered then there would be "serious adverse effects on
economic conditions or financial stability.",4 7 Once these conditions are
met, the FDIC may act to avoid or mitigate those adverse effects. 48 The
FDIC is allowed to use the Deposit Insurance Fund for an action under the
systemic risk exception. 49 However, the FDIC can expeditiously recover
the loss to the Fund, if any, from protecting insured claimants. 5 The
recovery on behalf of the Fund must be made through an assessment on the
total assets, equity and subordinated debt of all insured banks. 5'
C. The Federal Reserve Act
The Federal Reserve Act (FRA)52 contains, among other things, a
description of all the powers awarded to Federal Reserve Banks.
Traditionally, one of these powers has been to lend through a discount
window. In the past, the Fed only loaned to commercial banks.53
44 Mishkin, supra note 39, at 994.
45 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i) (2008). See also STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 2,
at 78.
46 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i) (2008).
47 ld.
48 Id.
49 1d. (12 U.S.C § 1823(c)(4)(E) establishes that the Deposit Insurance Fund cannot
be used in connection with an insured depository institution that would have the
effect of increasing losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund by protecting the
depositors or creditors. However, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i) is outside that
limitation.).
'o 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii) (stating the recovery must be made according to an
assessment on the total assets of all insured banks).
51 id.
52 Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 12 U.S.C. § 221 (2000).
53 David Fettig, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Lender of More than Last
Resort, THE REGION, Dec. 2002, at 15, available at
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However, in 1932, the Federal Reserve Act was amended to allow the
Federal Reserve Board to make the discount window in the Federal Reserve
Banks accessible to other financial institutions beyond commercial banks. 
54
Section 13(3) of the FRA states:
In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by the
affirmative vote of not less than five members, may
authorize any Federal reserve bank ... to discount for any
individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and
bills of exchange . . . [pJrovided, [t]hat before
discounting...... the Federal reserve bank shall obtain
evidence that such individual, partnership, or corporation is
unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from
other banking institutions.... 55
The process outlined by the FRA requires: (1) the Board of
Governors of the Fed to determine that the circumstances are unusual and
exigent; (2) evidence that no other banking institution is willing to provide
the credit; (3) at least five members of the Board of Governors of the Fed to
give authorization; and, (4) the Board of Governors to authorize any
Federal Reserve bank to discount the instruments of an individual,
partnership, or corporation.
D. Housing and Economic Recovery Act
On July 30, 2008, in response to the subprime mortgage crisis, 56
the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) was enacted. 5'
One of the primary purposes of HERA was to reinforce and improve the
regulation of the housing government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs),
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/02-12/lender.pdf.pdf
publicationspapers/pub-display.cfm?id=3392.
14 12 U.S.C. S. § 343 (2008). See also WALKER F. TODD, AM. INST. FOR ECON.
RESEARCH, THE BEAR STEARNS RESCUE AND EMERGENCY CREDIT FOR
INVESTMENT BANKS (Aug. 11, 2008), available at
http://www.aier.org/research/445-the-bear-steams-rescue-and-emergency-credit-
for-investment-banks?format=pdf.
5' 12 U.S.C.S. § 343 (2008).
56 See generally David Messerschmitt et al., Developments in Banking and
Financial Law: 2006 - 2007: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 27 REV. BANKING
AND FIN. L. 1 (2008).
57 Housing Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110- 289, 122 Stat. 2654
(2008).
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Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Banks. 58 To
accomplish this goal, HERA established a new, independent regulator: the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which phased out the regulator
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight, and the regulator of the Federal Home Loan Banks, the Federal
Housing Finance Board.5 9 Under HERA, the FHFA has powers for prompt
corrective action. 6o Within those powers, the FHFA can exercise control
over "critically undercapitalized regulated entities. ,61
One of the approaches that FHFA can take is conservatorship. 62
The purpose of placing the entity in conservatorship is to reorganize,
rehabilitate, or wind up "the affairs of a regulated entity."6 3 According to
Section 1145 of HERA, the Director of the FHFA has the discretion to
appoint the FHFA as the conservator or receiver of one of these GSEs. 64
HERA lists twelve different grounds for making a discretionary
appointment. 65 The grounds range from the entity engaging in money
laundering to simply its consenting to the conservatorship.6 6 HERA also
gives the Director of FHFA the power to place the GSEs in mandatory
receivership.67 The decision to place an entity under receivership or
conservatorship is reviewable only by a court.68 Within thirty days of the
Director's decision to place a GSE in receivership or conservatorship, the
entity can "bring an action in the United States district court for the judicial
district in which the home office of such regulated entity is located, or in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia" to require the
FHFA to remove itself as conservator or receiver. 69 The court has the
power to dismiss the action or to direct the FHFA to remove itself from the
58 Press Release, U.S. Senate, Summary of the Housing and Economic Recovery




60 Housing Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110- 289 § 1133, 122
Stat. 2654 (2008.).





65 Id. The twelve grounds listed in Section 1145 are: assets insufficient for
obligations, substantial dissipation, unsafe or unsound condition, cease and desist
orders, concealment, inability to meet obligations, losses, violations of law,
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position of conservator or receiver. 70
Also, Section 1117 of HERA granted the Secretary of the Treasury
authority until December 31, 2009, to buy obligations and other securities
issued by GSEs, as long as the Secretary made a determination of
emergency. 71 To make a finding of emergency, the Secretary of Treasury
needs to determine that the actions are necessary to: "(i) provide stability to
the financial markets, (ii) prevent disruptions in the availability of mortgage
finance; and (iii) protect the taxpayer." 72 HERA does not limit the amount
that the Treasury can purchase.
E. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
On October 3, 2008, the President signed into law the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA).7 4 EESA was a radical move
by the government of the United States to stabilize the financial system and
protect the economic welfare of Americans. 75 EESA contains a provision
for the "Troubled Asset Relief Program" (TARP).7 6 EESA gave the
Secretary of the Treasury not only authority to develop and implement the
TARP program, but also discretion to determine the terms and conditions of
the program.77 EESA requires that the Secretary of the Treasury consult
with the Fed, the FDIC, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the
Office of Thrift Supervision, the Chairman of the National Credit Union
Administration, and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development as
the Secretary exercises authority related to TARP. 78 EESA also authorizes
the Secretary of the Treasury to take any action the Secretary considers
necessary to perform his or her authorities under EESA. 79 Furthermore, the
70 id.
71 Id. at § 1117 (amending Section 304 of the Federal National Mortgage
Association Charter Act (12 U.S.C. § 1719 (2000)) and Section 306 of the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act (12 U.S.C. § 1455 (2000)).72 Id. at § 1117.
73 Id.
74 David M. Herszenhom, Bush Signs Bill, N. Y. Rules, NY TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at
Al.
75 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Paulson Statement on Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act (Oct. 3, 2008), available at
http://treas.gov/press/releases/hp 175.htm.
76 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 101(a),
122 Stat. 3765 (2008) (granting authority to the Secretary of the Treasury "to
purchase, and to make and fund commitments to purchase, troubled assets from any
financial institution, on such terms and conditions as are determined by the
Secretary, and in accordance with this Act and the policies and procedures
developed and published by the Secretary.").77id.
7 Id. at § 101 (b).
79 Id. at § 101(c).
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Act requires the Secretary of the Treasury to publish program guidelines
"[b]efore the earlier of the end of the 2-business-day period beginning on
the date of the first purchase of troubled assets.., or the end of the 45-day
period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act." 80 Finally, the Act
establishes that the Secretary of the Treasury must take the necessary steps
to prevent unjust enrichment by participating institutions. 81
V. APPLICATION OF THE LAW
The laws discussed above relate to the powers conferred to
governmental agencies to respond to situations in which a financial
institution's failure poses a significant risk to the economy. FDIA provided
the essentiality doctrine, granting considerable discretion to the Board of
Directors of the FDIC, only requiring a majority of the FDIC Board to
agree on the essentiality finding. 82  FDICIA replaced the FDIA's
essentiality doctrine with the least-cost requirement, and provided for the
"systemic risk" exception. 83 FDICIA made the process more public by
requiring the FDIC Board and the Fed to make a recommendation to the
Secretary of the Treasury that the least-cost procedure should not be used.
Then, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the President, was
required to determine that utilizing the least-cost procedure would lead to
"serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability." 84
FDICIA also granted considerable discretion to the FDIC, the Fed and the
Secretary of the Treasury by not providing specific objectives as to how
"serious" the adverse effects, or what the nature of the adverse effect on
economic conditions of financial institutions, need to be. The FRA
provides that in "unusual and exigent circumstances" the Fed's discount
window (usually only available to commercial banks) could be available to
anyone (including financial institutions and individuals) that the Fed
authorizes. 85 The authorization must be made by at least five of the seven
members of the Fed, and furthermore, it needs to be accompanied by
evidence that no other banking institution is able to secure credit. 86 The
FRA did not give the Fed clear guidance as to what "unusual" or "exigent"
means within the context of the statute.
More recently, HERA gave the Director of FHFA broad discretion
to place a critically undercapitalized entity in conservatorship or
receivership, as long as the decision is supported by one of the twelve
80 d. at § 101(d).
81 Id. at § 101(e).
82 Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, § 13(c), 64 Stat. 873, 889 (1950) (current
version at 12 U.S.C.S. § 1823 (2008)).
83 Stem & Feldman, supra note 2, app. at 154.
4 Id.; 12 U.S.C.S. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i) (2008).
85 12 U.S.C.S. § 343 (2008).
86 id.
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grounds provided in HERA 87 Finally, EESA granted the Secretary of the
Treasury expansive discretion to develop, implement and determine the
terms and conditions of TARP. 88. Through this program, up to $700 billion
could be disbursed. 89 TBTF statutes grant considerable discretion to the
relevant agencies, without providing clear guidance as to how and when the
discretion should be used. How those agencies have exercised their
discretion has established the changing parameters of the government's
TBTF policy.
A. Continental Bank of Illinois and FDICIA
The most prominent case for the FDIC acting under Section
13(c)(2) of FDIA is that of Continental Bank of Illinois in 1984.90
Continental, a leading commercial lender, became insolvent due to a run of
wholesale deposits from around the world. 91 Concerned over the potential
adverse consequences that the failure of Continental could have on the
entire banking system, the FDIC decided to intervene. First, to address the
short-term problem, the FDIC provided a $1.5 billion subordinated loan,
which could be called at any time with the FDIC Board's approval. 92 The
FDIC granted the loan under Section 13(c)(2). 93 The FDIC had made a
finding of essentiality, but the press release at the time did not mention
this. 94 Furthermore, the FDIC, in connection with the subordinated loan,
granted 100% protection to all depositors (including uninsured depositors)
and all general creditors. 95 Meanwhile, the FDIC continued searching for
banks interested in acquiring Continental while making the depositors and
creditors whole in the process. 96 However, no buyer was found. 9'
Two months later, the FDIC decided to act under Section 13(c)(2)
of FDIA again and provide a bailout. 98 The bailout package consisted of
the FDIC purchasing the bad loans and injecting new capital into the
87 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110- 289 § 1145(a),
122 Stat. 2654, 2734-35 (2008).
88 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 10 1(a),
122 Stat. at3765, 3767 (2008).
89 Id. at § 115(a).
90 See generally Sprague, supra note 29, at 149-228.
91 Id. at 149.
92 Id. at 159-60.
9 3 1d. at 161.94 Id. at 162. (Sprague, a member of the FDIC Board at the time of the bailout,
wrote in his book: "We had made an essentiality finding, but it was not mentioned
in the press release.").
95 id.
96 FDIC History, supra note 40, at 244; Sprague, supra note 29, at 170.
97 FDIC History, supra note 40, at 244; Sprague, supra note 29, at 170.
98 Id.
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bank. 99 The FDIC purchased $4.5 billion in bad loans for $3.5 billion, and
the bank continued to manage those loans under a servicing contract. 100
The bank had to write off the $1 billion loss for the loan transfer, but the
FDIC acquired $1 billion of preferred non-voting stock in Continental's
holding company to replace the loss. 10 The holding company was required
to downstream the FDIC's investment to the bank as equity. 102 A new bank
holding company was created, and all the outstanding common stock of
Continental Bank was transferred to it. 103 Continental's top management
and Board of Directors were removed and replaced by officers that the
FDIC chose. 104 The actions under Section 13(c)(2) protected both
depositors (including uninsured depositors) and creditors of the Bank. On
September 19, 1984, the House Banking Committee held a hearing about
the rescue of Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago. 105
B. Long Term Capital Management and Fed's Pressure
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) was a hedge fund in
Greenwich, Connecticut. 106 This hedge fund was founded in 1993 by an
elite group of individuals including: Myron Scholes and Robert C. Merton,
Nobel Prize-winning economists; John Meriwether, former vice chairman
of Salomon Brothers; David Mullins, former vice chairman of the Fed; and
Eric Rosenfeld, former professor at Harvard University. 107 The idea behind
this hedge fund was that its investments could be grouped in such a way
that risk was reduced to almost zero. 108 The fund's strategy was to make
many small profits. 109 The fund proved to be very successful from 1994
through 1998. 110
The fund was investing in international markets as well. The East
Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the Russian financial crisis of 1998 were
99 Sprague, supra note 29, at 209.
'00 FDIC History, supra note 44, at 244.
101 Sprague, supra note 29, at 209-210.
102 id.
'
03 Id. at 210.
'041d. at 205-06, 210.
105 Tim Carrington, U.S. Won't Let II Biggest Banks In Nation Fail, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 20, 1984, at A2.
106 Edward Pekarek, Pruning the Hedge: Who is a "Client" and Whom does an
adviser advise?, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 913, 949 (2007).
107 Thayer Watkins, Long Term Capital Management, (Aug. 17, 2009),
http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/ltcm.htm.
log Id.
109 Id. ("Myron Scholes stated the objective of LTCM in a striking image. He said
LTCM would function like a giant vacuum cleaner sucking up nickels that
everyone else had overlooked.")
11o0 
.
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factors in giving rise to the failure of the fund. 1 As of August 1, 1998,
LTCM's equity was $4.1 billion; however, during the next thirty days, its
equity dropped to $2.3 billion. 112 Finally, by the third week of September
of 1998, the equity of the fund was reduced from $2.3 billion to $600
million, which elevated leverage in a significant manner. 113 Banks became
concerned that their proprietary positions were not covered. 114 During the
weekend of September 19 and 20, some banks discussed unwinding their
exposure, but not all the banks could do it at the same time. "' LTCM
needed immediate intervention. 116
On Sunday, September 20, the Fed intervened because of the fear
of systemic risk. Although lacking jurisdiction over hedge funds, the Fed
chose to act. 117 In that spirit, the only immediate option the Fed saw was a
consortium. 118 The Fed started to work out the details of the consortium
and invited representatives of the most influential financial institutions at
the time to convene at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 119 The
bankers, pressured by the Fed, came up with an agreement. 120 The
consortium would inject about $3.5 billion in exchange for a 90% stake in
the fund. 121 Bankers Trust, Barclays, Chase, Deutsche Bank, UB, Salomon
Smith Barney, J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse
First Boston, and Morgan Stanley each contributed $300 million. Soci~t6
G6n6rale contributed $125 million, while Credit Agricole, Bank Paribas
and Lehman Brothers contributed $100 million each. 122 There was no
guarantee by the Fed to any of the institutions participating in the bailout.
11 Professor Jomo K. S., Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Asia Research Institute,
National University of Singapore, Beyond Miracle and Debacle in East Asia, (Nov.
24 2004), available at http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/showfile.asp? eventfileid=195.
112 Ludwig B. Chincarini, The Failure of Long-Term Capital Management (Oct. 8,
1998), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract=-952512.
113 Id
114 Watkins, supra note 107.
115 Steven Lipin, Matt Murray & Jacob M. Schlesinger, Bailout Blues: How a Big
Hedge Fund Marketed Its Expertise And Shrouded Its Risks --- Regulators and
Lenders Knew Little About the Gambles At Long-Term Capital --- 'Stardust' in
Investors'Eyes, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1998, at Al.
116 ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-
TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 197 (Random House 2000).
117 Anita Raghavan & Mitchell Pacelle, To the Rescue? A Hedge Fund Falters, So
the Fed Persuades Big Banks to Ante Up --- Firms to Lend $3.6 Billion As Long-
Term Capital Loses on Its Bond Bets --- 'Star Power' and Red Ink, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 24, 1998, at Al.
118 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 116 at 196-98.
"
9 Id. at 199-201.
120 Id. at 204-208.
121 Raghavan & Pacelle, supra note 117.
122 Lipin, Murray & Schlesinger, supra note 115.
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By 2000, the fund was completely liquidated and the consortium was paid
back.
C. Bear Stearns and FRA
In March of 2008, the government faced the first major disaster of
what until then had been considered a crisis confined to the subprime
mortgage market: Bear Steams (Bear), a large investment bank, was about
to collapse. 123 Unlike Continental Bank, Bear, as an investment bank, was
not under the protection of the FDIC, so its possible failure did not call for
the FDIC's intervention. The Fed decided to act by providing Bear with a
twenty-eight day emergency loan through JP Morgan. 124 Later that month,
the Fed relied on Section 13(3) of the FRA to bail out Bear by providing a
loan through JP Morgan, who was buying Bear, of almost $30 billion. 125
Under Section 13(3) of the FRA, the Fed has the authority to open the
discount window to anyone, as long as it is approved by at least five
members of the Fed and complies with the standards of the statute. 126 It
was only the second time the Fed relied on Section 13(3) in seventy-five
years. 127 Following the procedure stated in the statute, the Fed determined
that the circumstances were "unusual and exigent" in light of the weak
financial markets and the interconnectedness of Bear. 128 Also, the Fed
concluded that Bear was "unable to secure adequate credit accommodations
elsewhere." 129 The four members present at the meeting unanimously
approved the non-recourse loan collateralized by a pool of Bear assets and
determined that the action was required before the other board member
could return and participate, therefore complying with the procedure set in
123 Samar Srivastava & Jeff Kearns, Bear Stearns Falls to 5-Year Low on Capital
Concern, BLOOMBERG PRESS, Mar. 13, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=a69chRKal0mo.
124 Stephen Bernard, JPMorgan Chase Funding Bear Stearns: Bear Stearns lost
half of its value within 30 minutes of the market open, INT'L BUS. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2008, available at http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20080314/ jpmorgan-chase-
funding-bear-steams.htm.
125 Todd, supra note 54.
126 12 U.S.C.S. § 343 (2008).
127 David Fettig, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, The History of a Powerful
Paragraph (2008), available at
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publicationspapers/pub display.cfm?id=3485.
128 Turmoil in US. credit markets: examining the recent action offederalfinancial
regulators: Hearing Before the S. Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Comm.
10th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors), available at
http:/Ibanking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStoreid =
OaOecO16-ad6l-4736-b6e3-7eb61 fbc0c69.
129 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Minutes (Mar. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/other 20080627al.pdf.
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the statute. 130 Two days later, the Fed also authorized the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York to make the discount window available to all the
primary securities dealers. This decision was based on "recent, rapidly
changing developments."
D. Lehman Brothers and Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
The next challenge the government faced was Lehman Brothers'
(Lehman) imminent collapse. 131 Lehman, another large investment bank,
had significant investments in real estate related holdings that had gone bad,
and the firm could not raise new capital to offset losses from these
investments. 132 As Lehman's situation quickly worsened, the expectations
were that Lehman would be bailed out, given that Lehman was bigger than
Bear, and Lehman was more involved in the mortgage-backed securities
market, which could result in more chaos than Bear's collapse. 133 Rumors
also were circulating as to who would buy Lehman. 134 No buyer stepped
forward, and the government decided not to rescue Lehman. 135 Lehman
filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. 136 Secretary of the Treasury
130 Id. (clarifying that even though the statute requires at least five members to
consent, only four members of the Board were present at the meeting where the
action was authorized). According to the minutes of the meeting, the FRA
requires that when fewer than five members are present the vote must be
unanimous and the action must be necessary before the other member will be
available. See Federal Reserve Act § 1 (r), 12 U.S.C. § 248(r) (2006).
131 Jenny Anderson & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Said to Be Looking for a
Buyer as Pressure Builds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2008, at Al.
132 Paul R. La Monica, Lehman: Too Big to Fail?, CNN MONEY.COM,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/10/markets/thebuzz; Rachel Beck, All Business.:
Lehman Shows Few are Too Big to Fail, INT'L Bus. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008,
available at http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20080916/all-business-lehman-
shows-few-are-too-big-to-fail.htm (describing that expectations came from the fact
that Lehman was larger than Bear, and Lehman was more involved in the
mortgage-backed securities market which could result in more chaos than Bear's
collapse).133 id.
133Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bids to Halt Financial Crisis Reshape Landscape of Wall
St., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, at Al.
133 Press Release, Lehman Bros. Holdings, Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. Announces
It Intends to File Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition (Sept. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.lehman.com/press/pdf 2008/091508_lbhi-chapter 1announce.pdf.
134 id.
135Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bids to Halt Financial Crisis Reshape Landscape of Wall
St., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, at Al.
136 Press Release, Lehman Bros. Holdings, Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. Announces
It Intends to File Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition (Sept. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.lehman.com/press/pdf 2008/091508_lbhi chapter 11 announce.pdf.
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Paulson stated that bailing out Lehman was not an option he considered
because of the moral hazard issue. 137 In retrospect, Paulson maintained that
letting Lehman fail was the right decision, especially because there was no
buyer for Lehman. 138
E. AIG and FRA
Days after Lehman's bankruptcy filing, the Fed faced another
failing institution: American International Group (AIG). AIG, the largest
insurer in the world, got in trouble when its credit ratings were
downgraded 139 to the point where it needed to post $14 billion more in
collateral for credit-default swaps. 140 AIG's assets amount to $1.1 trillion,
with more than seventy million customers, including many of the world's
biggest and most important financial firms. 141 On September 16, 2008, the
Fed authorized the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to create a line of
credit of up to $85 billion for AIG. 142 The loan was collateralized by
AIG's assets and the assets of "its primary non-regulated subsidiaries." 
143
137 Martin Crutsinger, Paulson Says Lehman Bailout was Never an Option, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Sept. 15, 2008, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/09/15/business/NA-US-Paulson-Markets.php;
Ziad Raymond Azar, Bankruptcy Policy: A Review and Critique of Bankruptcy
Statutes and Practices in Fifty Countries Worldwide, 16 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 279, 293 n.36 (2008) ("Moral hazard is the risk that an economic player
will change (inefficiently) its behavior because of the (real or perceived) decrease
in the cost that is associated with taking a particular action.").
138 Martin Crutsinger, Paulson says Global Markets Remain Strained, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Oct. 8, 2008, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/10/08/business/NA-US-Meltdown-
Paulson.php.
139 Chua Kong Ho & Shani Raja, Asian Stocks Extend Global Rout on AIG
Downgrade; Banks Fall, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 16, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news ?pid=20601080&sid=aHhtaYZNzVI ("The
ratings downgrades occurred after two people familiar with the situation said that
the biggest U.S. insurer by assets is seeking $70 billion to $75 billion in loans
arranged by Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and JPMorgan Chase & Co. to replenish
capital.")
140 Andy Serwer & Allan Sloan, The Price of Greed, TIME, Sept. 29, 2008, at 32,
35.
141 Tami Luhby, Why the Fed Pulled the Trigger on AIG, CNNMONEY.COM, Sep.
17, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/17/news/companies/aigexplainer/index.htm.
142 Edmund L. Andrews et al., Fed's $85 Billion Loan Rescues Insurer, N.Y.
TIMES.COM, Sept. 16, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/business/1 7insure.html?_r = 1 &scp= 1 &sq=Fed
's%20%2485%2OBillion%2OLoan%20Rescues%20nsurer&st-cse.
143 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 16, 2008),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/ 2 0080916a.htm.
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In exchange for the loan, the government received a 79.9% equity interest
in AIG and the "right to veto the payment of dividends to common and
preferred shareholders." 144 Once again relying on Section 13(3) of the
FRA, the Federal Reserve Board, with the approval of five board members,
decided to open the Fed's loan facility to a non-commercial bank. The Fed
stated that such action was necessary under the "current circumstances,"
pointing to the "unusual and exigent" requirement. 145 Chairman Ben
Bernanke expressed that the Fed prevented AIG's default because a
"disorderly failure of AIG would have severely threatened global financial
stability and the performance of the U.S. economy." 146 Nothing further was
mentioned at the time as to the Fed's compliance with any of the other
requirements of Section 13(3). For example, the Fed was silent as to the
statute's requirements that AIG have exhausted all other sources of credit.
On October 8, 2008, the Fed relied on Section 13(3) again. This time the
Fed authorized the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to "borrow up to
$37.8 billion in investment-grade, fixed-income securities from AIG in
return for cash collateral." 147 The Fed did not reveal anything as to the
application of the factors of Section 13(3); the only explanation was that
this action would allow AIG to "replenish liquidity." 148
F. Wachovia and FDICIA
For seventeen years, the "systemic risk" exception of the FDICIA
went unused. On September 26, 2008, Wachovia's stock plummeted 27%
and depositors started to withdraw from their accounts any excess of
$100,000 (what was insured by the FDIC at the time). 149 Out of concern
for the effects of a possible failure, on September 29, the FDIC acted for the
first time under the systemic risk exception of the 1991 FDICIA and
ordered Wachovia to sell itself to Citigroup. 150 Before giving such order,
44id
145 id.
146 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Address at the National Association for Business Economics 50th Annual Meeting,
Washington, D.C.: Current Economic and Financial Conditions Oct. 7, 2008,
available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bemanke20081007a.htm.
147 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 8, 2008),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20081008a.htm.
148 Id.
149 Peter St. Onge, Stunningly Swift Fall for Wachovia: Sale to Citigroup
Technically Keeps Bank from Failing, but Layoffs are Still Likely, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Sept. 30, 2008, available at
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/408/story/222685.htm.
150 Rick Rothacker & Kerry Hall, Wachovia Faced a 'Silent' Bank Run,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 2, 2008, available at
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as determined by FDICIA, the FDIC and the Fed made the recommendation
to the Secretary of the Treasury. 151 The Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the President, gave the approval. 152 Secretary of the
Treasury Paulson stated: "I agree with the FDIC and the Federal Reserve
that a failure of Wachovia would have posed a systemic risk." 153 As a
result, all of Wachovia's creditors were protected. 154 As part of the
arrangement, the FDIC agreed to take on all the losses in Wachovia's loan
and investment portfolio in excess of $42 billion (that was assumed by
Citigroup) from a pool of $312 billion in loans, in exchange for $12 billion
in preferred stock and warrants in Citigroup. 155 Wachovia, however, ended
up refusing the deal with Citigroup, and sold itself to Wells Fargo in an
unassisted transaction. On October 12, the Fed approved the Wells Fargo
acquisition. 156
G. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and HERA
On Sunday, September 7, 2008, after regulating GSEs for a little
over a month, the FHFA appointed itself as the conservator of Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae. The preceding Friday, Fannie and Freddie's shares fell
more than 80% as of the end of the day's trading. "' Also, FHFA's action
was a response, in part, to government's fears that "foreigners wouldn't
continue funding our trade and federal-budget deficits." ' In his
statement, the Director of the FHFA, James B. Lockhart, stated that the
actions were in response to safety and soundness concerns at the GSEs. ,59
Besides safety and soundness concerns, Lockhart's determination was based
on the condition of the current market, Freddie's and Fannie's financial
performance and condition, their "inability to fund themselves according to
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/408/story/226799.html?q=wachovia%20faced%
20a%20silent%20bank%20run.
151 Press Release, FDIC (Sept. 29, 2008) [hereinafter FDIC Sept. 29 Press Release],
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08O88.html.
152 Id.
153 Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of the Treasury, Statement by Henry Paulson, U.S.
Sec'y of the Treasury, on the Sale of Wachovia Bank (Sept. 29, 2008), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp I 164.htm.
114 FDIC Sept. 29 Press Release, supra note 151.
155 Opinion, Pre-emptive Plumbing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2008, at A 18.
156 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 12, 2008),
available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/20081012a.htm.
... David Ellis, US. Seizes Fannie and Freddie, CNN MONEY.COM (Sept. 7, 2008),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/07/news/companies/fanniefreddie/index.htm.
158 Serwer & Sloan, supra note 140.
159 Press Release, Office of Fed. Hous. Enterprise Oversight, Statement of James B.
Lockhart, Director, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency (Sept. 7, 2008) [hereinafter FHFA
Press Release], available at
http://treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/fhfastatement_090708hp I 128.pdf.
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normal practices and prices," and the important role that Freddie and
Fannie play in the residential mortgage market. "6 Although HERA gives
Lockhart broad discretion to place a GSE into conservatorship, he also
relied somewhat on the "insight and perspective" of the Federal Reserve and
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. ,6' Freddie and Fannie
consented to Lockhart's decision of placing the FHFA as their conservator,
as consent is an acceptable ground to make the appointment. ,62 As part of
the conservatorship, the FHFA assumed the power of the Board and
management and replaced the CEOs of both GSEs. 163 The plan also
committed the Treasury to provide up to $100 billion to each GSE 6I
through the purchase of preferred stock.
H. Capital Purchase Program, Liquidity Guarantee Program, EESA
and FDICIA
On October 14, 2008, the Secretary of the Treasury outlined how it
would use the first $250 billion in the implementation of EESA. 166 The
Treasury introduced the voluntary Capital Purchase Program, in which a
broad array of financial institutions could participate and sell shares of
preferred stock to the government. The stated purpose of the program at the
time was to improve the lending capacity of these institutions and promote
economic growth. 167 Complying with the "two-day" EESA provision, the
Treasury published the details of TARP the same day that it announced the
program. According to the publication, TARP is available by application to
bank and financial holding companies, and savings and loan holding
companies engaged only in financial activities authorized by the law. 16' The
160 Id. Lockhart had discretionary appointment. He did not need to make any of
these findings, only one ground was needed, and in this case, Freddie and Fannie
consented. Consent is an acceptable ground.
161 Id.
162 Id.; see also Zachary A. Goldfarb et al., Treasury to Rescue Fannie and Freddie,
WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2008 at AOl.
163 FHFA Press Release, supra note 159.
164 Stephen Labaton & Edmund Andrews, In Rescue to Stabilize Lending, U.S.
Takes Over Mortgage Finance Titans, NYTIMES.COM, Sept. 7, 2008 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/08/business/08fannie.html.
165 Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, Treasury Senior
Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement, Sept. 7, 2008, available at
http://ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/pspafactsheet_090708%20hp 1128. pdf.
166 Deborah Solomon & David Enrich, Devil Is in Bailout's Details ---
Government's $250 Billion Cash Injection Sparks Welter of Issues, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 15, 2008 atAl.
167 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal
Reserve and FDIC (Oct. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Joint Release], available at
http://treas.gov/press/releases/hp 1206.htm.
168 U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Application Guidelines for TARP Capital Purchase
Program (Nov. 17, 2008) [hereinafter TARP CPP Guidelines], available at
http://treas.gov/press/releases/reports/applicationguidelines.pdf.
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Treasury, in consultation with the appropriate federal banking agency for
the applicant, would decide whether the applicant is eligible for TARP. 69
The Treasury would acquire non-voting senior preferred shares that pay a
cumulative dividend rate of five percent a year for the first five years and a
rate of nine percent a year thereafter. '70 The shares are callable at par after
three years, or redeemable before then "with the proceeds from a qualifying
equity offering of any Tier 1 perpetual preferred or common stock." 17' The
Treasury also receives warrants to purchase common stock limited to fifteen
percent of its total investment in the institution. 172 Moreover, to comply
with the unjust enrichment provision, the Treasury requires the
participating organizations to adopt certain standards that relate to
prohibiting excessive compensation of senior executives. 173
At the time the Secretary of the Treasury introduced the program,
he also announced that nine ma *or financial institutions had already agreed
to participate in the program. There is no mention of these institutions
applying to TARP. The Treasury essentially forced nine U.S. banks to
participate in the program and offered a total of $125 billion to these nine
institutions. 175 Some of the institutions and the amount that the Treasury
agreed to buy from each were: Bank of America (including recently
acquired Merrill Lynch), J.P. Morgan, Citigroup and Wells Fargo, $25
billion from each; Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, $10 billion from
each; Bank of New York Mellon, $3 billion; and about $2 billion from State
Street. 176 The remaining $125 billion has been made available to medium
and small institutions that apply, subject to approval. '
In the same press release, the FDIC joined the Fed in announcing
another new program. ' The FDIC's program consisted of temporarily
guaranteeing senior debt of all institutions already insured by the FDIC and
the senior debt of some holding companies. 79 The FDIC would also
guarantee deposits in "non-interest bearing deposit transaction
accounts." ' The FDIC relied on the systemic risk exception under
169 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces TARP Capital
Purchase Program Description (Oct. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hpl207.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2009).170 id.
171 Id.
172 Id. ("Treasury will receive warrants to purchase common stock with an
aggregate market price equal to 15 percent of the senior preferred investment.")
173 Id.
174 id,
175 Deborah Solomon & David Enrich, supra note 166 (stating that the government
agreed to buy $25 billion each from Bank of America, J.P. Morgan, Citigroup and
Wells Fargo, $10 billion from Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, $3 billion from
Bank of New York Mellon, and around $2 billion from State Street Bank).
176 id.
177 id.
178 Joint Release, supra note 167.
179 i
180 id.
Paying the Price for Too Big to Fail
FDICIA. 81 The Fed and FDIC made a written recommendation to the
Secretary of the Treasury, who then consulted with the President and made
the determination. 182 After the systemic risk finding, the FDIC was allowed
to take actions to mitigate the adverse effects on economic conditions and
on stability of the system. ,83 The program has two main parts: the debt
guarantee program and the transaction account guarantee program. The
debt guarantee program consists of guaranteeing a certain amount of the
newly-issued senior unsecured debt until June 30, 2009. "4 The FDIC
believed that this program would provide liquidity to the market and
promote stability in the unsecured funding market while it discouraged
complex funding structures and risky loans. ,8' The second part, the
transaction account guarantee program, would fully protect funds held in
non-interest bearing transaction accounts of FDIC-insured institutions and
exceeding the current deposit insurance limit. 116 Interestingly, if the
assessments of the program are not sufficient to pay for the expenses, then a
special assessment under U.S.C. § 1823 (c)(4)(G)(ii) would be made against
all insured depository institutions regardless of their participation in this
187program.
I. Citigroup, EESA and FDICIA
Citigroup, the second largest U.S. bank by assets,"" was one of the
large financial institutions that seemed to be standing still in the midst of
the financial crisis. On Friday, November 21, 2008, the giant succumbed
when the price of its stock went down to $3.77, 60% lower than at the
beginning of the week and totaling a 72% loss during the month of
November. 189 Critics speculate that the cause of such plunge in the stock
price was the Treasury's announcement earlier in the month that it would
no longer buy toxic assets from banks. 190 As the situation worsened,
Citigroup's top officers and government officials started to look for options
181 Id.
182 Id.; FDIC, Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program 73 Fed. Reg. 72244 (Nov.
26, 2008) [hereinafter TLGP].
183 Id.
114 Id. at 72245.
185 id.
186 Id. at 72246.
187 Id. at 72250.
188 Dan Wilchins & Jonathan Stempel, Citigroup Shares Drop; CEO Plans to Keep
Smith Barney, REUTERS, Nov. 21, 2008, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSTRE4AJ45G20081121.
189 Rob Curran, Large Stock Focus. Citigroup's November Swoon: Down 72%,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2008, at B3.
190 Id; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks by Sec'y Henry M.
Paulson on Financial Rescue Package and Economic Update, available at
http://ustreas.gov/press/releases/hpl265.htm (declaring that Treasury was not
planning to buy distressed mortgage assets anymore).
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to stabilize the company and boost investors' confidence. '9' Late on
Sunday, November 23, the FDIC, Fed and Treasury revealed a bailout
plan. 1 2 The plan included a series of transactions between Citigroup, FDIC,
Fed and Treasury. 93 The Treasury, FDIC and Fed will protect the company
against losses in a $306 billion pool of loans and securities backed by real
estate and other similar assets. Citigroup will keep these assets on its
balance sheet. ', Citigroup is responsible for the first $29 billion in losses in
the pool of assets and 10% of the remainder of the losses. 196 The Treasury
agreed to cover the next $5 billion in losses in the pool of assets, and the
FDIC will cover the next $10 billion in losses. 19' The Fed agreed to cover all
losses beyond that point through a non-recourse loan. ' In exchange for
the protection, Citigroup issued non-voting preferred stock to the FDIC
and the Treasury. '9 Citigroup agreed to submit an executive
compensation plan with restrictions to be approved by the government.
Also, the Treasury invested $20 billion in Citigroup from TARP in exchange
for non-voting preferred stock with an 8% dividend. 201 The agencies stated
that the actions were "necessary to strengthen the financial system and
protect U.S. taxpayers and the U.S. economy." 202 The FDIC relied on the
systemic risk exception under FDICIA and voted unanimously to get
203involved in the Citigroup rescue. The Treasury relied on their authority
under EESA to disburse the TARP funds. 204 The rapid reaction and the
extent of the Citigroup bailout increased the criticism that the government
"is willing to do anything to bail out the biggest banks, while letting smaller
ones, consumers, and small companies, fail." 205
191 David Enrich et al., U.S. Agrees to Rescue Struggling Citigroup--- Plan Injects
$20 Billion in Fresh Capital, Guarantees $306 Billion in Toxic Assets, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 24, 2008, at Al.
192 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal












203 Damian Paletta, FDIC Vote on Citi Was Unanimous, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24,
2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122753695817253015.html
article/SB 122753695817253015.html?mod=googlenews-wsj.
204 See supra notes 5179-86 and accompanying text.
205 Damian Paletta & Deborah Solomon, Uncertainty on Strategy in Citi Rescue,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2008, at A10.
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J. Bank ofAmerica and EESA
As the financial crisis prolonged through the end of 2008 and into
2009, Bank of America (BofA) found itself severely affected. On
September 15, 2008, BofA offered to buy Merrill Lynch for $50 billion in a
stock for stock transaction. 206 On December 5, 2008, BofA's shareholders
approved the merger. 207 With the purchase of Merrill Lynch, BofA also
acquired huge debt and bad assets, resulting in more losses. 208 The
Treasury announced the agreement with BofA, on January 16, 2009, to
provide "a package of guarantees, liquidity access and capital . .,, 209 The
Treasury and the FDIC provided protection to a pool of assets, including
securities, backed by residential and commercial real estate loans, of about
$118 billion. 20 BofA retained the first $10 billion loss in this pool of
assets, while the Treasury, the Fed and the FDIC shared the next $10 billion
of losses. The Treasury and the FDIC are responsible for 90% of any losses
in excess of those $20 billion, while BofA assumed the remaining 10%. 211
The Treasury also made available a non-recourse plan to backstop residual
risk. 212 Also, the Treasury invested another $20 billion in BofA from the
TARP program for BofA's issuance of 8% dividend preferred stock. 213 The
Treasury relied on its authority under the TARP program in the EESA.214
This transaction was part of the Targeted Investment Program, the
guidelines of which were published in January 2, 2009, in accordance with
Section 101(d) of EESA. 215
206 Press Release, Bank of America, Bank of America Buys Merrill Lynch Creating
Unique Financial Services Firm (Sept. 15, 2008), available at
http://bankofamerica.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=press releases&item=8255.




208 Bank of America Bail-out Agreed, BBC NEWS, Jan. 16, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7832484.stm.
209 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury, Federal Reserve and the
FDIC Provide Assistance to Bank of America (Jan. 16, 2009), available at,
http://ustreas.gov/press/releases/hpl356.htm.2 10 id.
211 Patrick Rucker & Jonathan Stempel, Bank of America gets big Government
Bailout, REUTERS, Jan. 16, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE50F1Q720090116?feedType=R
SS&feedName--topNews.
212 U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 191203.
213 id.
214 id.
215 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Releases Guidelines for
Targeted Investment Program (Jan. 2, 2009), available at,
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hpl338.htm.
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VI. CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT APPROACH
Viewed from the eye of the storm, it's hard to say much of anything
positive about the current approach to TBTF. The very fact that it is being
shaped by events on a monthly or weekly basis admits of a policy that is
reactive rather than proactive. In truth, until the events of 2008, there was
no TBTF policy at all, but rather a set of ill-defined authorizations to "do
whatever it takes" in the face of systemic threats. Policymakers should be
given a wide berth for their creative efforts in the midst of an
unprecedented crisis.
As indicated, the statutory authority contained in the FDIC Act, the
Federal Reserve Act, and the recent Housing and Economic Recovery Act,
and their legislative histories, hardly provides direction to policymakers.
Similarly, the laws' procedural mandates are inconsistent, which is not
surprising in light of the time and circumstances of each law's enactment.
More troubling is the rather random delegation of authority by Congress to
four separate agencies and departments to weigh in on the fates of
systemically significant institutions. That these departments and agencies
have been able to coordinate their efforts at all, particularly during a
transition of administrations, is remarkable in itself. What the current crisis
has laid bare is the need for a centralized approach to this issue at the
federal level.
Compounding the statutory incoherence and the absence of
centralized authority with respect to TBTF has been a decade of over-
reliance on the efficacy of market discipline to allay systemic risk. For
example, in its 2007 report on the threats posed by private pools of capital,
the President's Working Group confidently stated, "Market discipline by
creditors, counterparties, and investors is the most effective mechanism for
limiting systemic risk ... 216 Even in the midst of the current crisis, the
Treasury Department in its Blueprint for reform, while recognizing the need
for a central systemic regulator, saw that regulator as merely a
"complement" to market discipline, 217 proving that the old mindset of blind
reliance on market discipline dies hard.
Gary Stem, one of the leading authorities on TBTF and President of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, generously chalked up the failure
of policymakers to develop a TBTF policy to their being preoccupied with
more weighty matters: "So, ex ante, other issues may have reasonably
216 President's Working Group, Agreement among PWG and U.S. Agency
Principals on Principles and Guidelines regarding Private Pools of Capital 3 (2007),
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hp272_principles.pdf.
217 U.S DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEP'T OF TREASURY BLUEPRINT FOR A
MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 15 (2008), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf.
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seemed more important, even if, ex post, TBTF is now viewed as
paramount," 218 he ruefully observed. Whether the aversion to addressing
the TBTF was worship at the altar of market discipline or preoccupation
with other matters, the consequences of that inattention are currently being
played out.
The reason the issue is "paramount" now lies not in the hundreds of
billions of taxpayers' dollars that have been devoted to failing firms.
Rather, the irony is that the sheer randomness of the bailouts has so
unsettled markets that a return to anything resembling a market economy is
dubious. The line between firms whose uninsured creditors are protected
by the government and those finns that do not enjoy this support has been
erased. Years of the pursuit and glorification of corporate gigantism will not
be reversed easily.
As the above chronicle of the 2008 bailouts demonstrates, sorting
out who was TBTF has been difficult. Constructive ambiguity worked to
the advantage of any firm that fell within its vague penumbra. Generally,
for example, market participants are still scratching their heads over a
Wachovia that was TBTF, demanding taxpayer support one day only to be
sold in a market transaction days later. Similarly, the collateral damage
from the Lehman bankruptcy, particularly with respect to the commercial
paper and money market mutual funds markets, has caused much second-
guessing of policymakers for their failure to intervene.
Equally mystifying was the how of each TBTF rescue operation. How
the agencies went about the bailouts has caused as much uncertainty as has
their targets of choice. Bailout models have included:
" Rescue and consolidation (JPMorgan Chase/Bear Steams and Bank
of America/Countrywide/Merrill),
" Rescue and downsizing (Citigroup),
" Rescue and disaggregation (AIG),
* Preservation (Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac),
* Triage (Bank of America), and
* Liquidity (FDIC's Temporary Liquidity Guaranty Program).
Each rescue operation is, of course, different, and the desired immediate
result is not necessarily the survival of the bailed-out firm, but the health of
the financial system. Nevertheless, the lack of cohesion to be found in how
the bailouts were conducted bears out the truism of one panel report: "Once
a crisis has arisen, financial regulation has already failed." 219
218 Gary H. Stem, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Address at
Winona State University: Too Big to Fail: The Way Forward (Nov. 13, 2008),
available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/news events/pres/stem 11-13-08.pdf
.news-events/pres/stem 11-13-08.cfm.
219 CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., SPECIAL REPORT ON
REGULATORY REFORM 22 (2009).
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VII. GETTING IT RIGHT THE NEXT TIME 
220
Starting with the Treasury's Blueprint, many of the reform
proposals point to the glaring gap in the regulatory structure represented by
the absence of an agency charged with the responsibility for monitoring and
addressing systemic risk. The cost for that gap is the current recession. The
same proposals go on to recommend that that gap be eliminated by
appointing an agency with the task and appropriate tools to carry out the
responsibility of ensuring financial stability.
The systemic risk puzzle has many parts of which TBTF is one.
The current systemic crisis, for example, started its life in a small segment
of the mortgage industry, an industry once thought to be an oasis of low-
risk activity. By itself, subprime lending was not systemically threatening
and was socially useful. However, a concatenation of actors from
securitizers to mortgage brokers to rating agencies amplified the subprime
market's impact and, in the process, revealed other serious weaknesses in
the financial system. Evident in the chain of actors that served as catalysts
for the crisis, naturally, were the world's largest and most complex
financial institutions. These institutions were the accelerants of the crisis
and, ironically, victims of it as well.
While large complex financial institutions can play a role in
amplifying a crisis, we know from recent observation that these institutions,
by their very size and complexity alone, pose a risk to the financial system.
The risk comes in the form of a possible disorderly liquidation with
unknown but potentially serious spillover effects on other institutions and
markets.
The scope and scale of financial institutions has been shown to be
accompanied by certain funding advantages. Some of these advantages are
attributable to scale. Other funding advantages can be attributed to sound
management while other advantages are due to market confidence in the
firm's business model. In some instances, the funding advantage is
attributable to the perception of creditors that large firms and their creditors
will be protected in the event of the firms' meltdown. This implicit backing
introduces an element of moral hazard to the operations of these firms and
adds a feature of pro-cyclicality that makes government rescue less remote
than it would be otherwise.
Thus, the systemic regulator in the new regulatory architecture
must address risks in at least two forms: first, the correlation of risks across
the system arising from products, asset prices, capital constraints, liquidity
stresses, and exotic instruments; and, second, the risks to the system posed
220 Cornelius Hurley, Getting It Right the Next Time on "Too Big to Fail"
REUTERS, Sept. 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersComService4/idUSTRE48S7XQ20080929.
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by large complex institutions. 221 It is to the later risk category, large
complex institutions, that we now turn.
It may be argued that the constructive ambiguity policy served a
useful purpose prior to 2008. It cannot be credibly claimed, however, that
the policy as practiced in 2008 was at all useful. Not surprisingly, of the
regulatory reform proposals reviewed by the author, none suggest that the
constructive ambiguity policy be retained.
Stem has argued that two elements of a sound TBTF policy are:
first, the appointment of "conservative" policymakers who instinctively
view government bailouts with abhorrence; 222 and, second, affirmative
signaling by the government that bailouts will not be forthcoming. In 2008,
both of these conditions were in place in the form of a very conservative
Treasury Secretary and a tangible message sent to market participants via
the Lehman bankruptcy that the government would not intervene
henceforth. Both the Secretary and the Lehman communication failed. In
their place, we are left with a series of TBTF bailouts that have trivialized
the very notion of government intervention to address systemic risk. 223
Naturally, many of the reform proposals address the issue of
systemic risk, or as some refer to it "systemic stability." Policymakers,
including Chairman Bemanke 224 and the presidents of the Reserve Banks
of Minneapolis and Boston, Stem 225 and Rosengren,226 have weighed in on
the issue. Chairman Frank of the House Financial Services Committee has
indicated that this issue is at the forefront of his committee's agenda in
addressing regulatory reform.
There appears to be an emerging consensus around the notion that
the new regulatory order must include an arm of the government whose
responsibility it is to monitor systemic risk and, when necessary, act upon
such risks when they threaten the stability of the financial system.
Similarly, the preponderant view appears to be that the Fed, as central
banker to the U.S. and lender of last resort, should take on this authority
221 A third category of systemically significant enterprises is those banks and
nonbanks providing essential infrastructure services such as custody, settlement,
clearing and payment services. Often, these services involve significant credit
relationships between the service providers and their customers.
222 Stem & Feldman, supra note 2, at 94.
223 See, e.g., Jonathan V. Last, Are Pro Sports Too Big to Fail?, WALL ST. J, Jan.
29, 2009, at Wl 1, available at http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB 123328241772832043 .html.
224 Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bank, Address at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City Annual Economic Symposium: Reducing Systemic
Risk (Aug. 22, 2008).
225 Stem & Feldman, supra note 2.
226 Eric S. Rosengren, President & Chief Executive Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of
Boston, Address at the International Centre for Business Information RiskMinds
2008 Conference: The Global Risk Regulation Summit: Some Principles to
Consider in Future Regulatory Reform (Dec. 8, 2008).
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and responsibility. 227 Whether it is the Fed or some new agency charged
with the systemic issue, some replacement strategy for constructive
ambiguity must be developed.
Chastened by the experiences of the last year, many commentators have
recognized that the fatal flaw of the current policy lies in its opaqueness. 228
Stated differently, firms that pose systemic risks need to be identified in
advance of a crisis. As observed below, both public and private actors are
already identifying systemically significant institutions, with some of these
receiving heightened regulatory scrutiny. This rather casual identification
and regulation process, like the TBTF policy itself, is not working. What is
needed is a more rigorous and transparent process for identifying TBTF
firms and, once identified, a more rigorous and transparent regulatory
regime applied to their operations. These two stages are referred to below
as "define" and "inform," but the key factor comes with the third stage.
Read on...
A. Defining TBTF Firms
In a real sense, regulators have been signaling for some time that
certain large firms are TBTF through the capital indulgences granted to
such firms. For banks, regulators have allowed massive amounts of
investment obligations to pile up off-balance sheet in structured investment
vehicles without any capital underpinning. The largest investment banks,
by the same token, were given explicit permission by the SEC to operate at
exceedingly high leverage ratios. The result of this regulatory signaling
was that the largest banks and investment banks "...believed the federal
government would never permit their creditors to suffer loss..." 229 Firm in
this belief, the managements of TBTF firms took on additional risk and
leverage and, for the most part, their estimates of government support
proved correct.
While the managements and boards of directors of large firms were
hearing and heeding the signals from their regulators, the same signals were
being sent to the markets. As far back as the Continental Bank bailout, the
Comptroller of the Currency explicitly identified eleven banks that he
227 On the role of the Fed there is less of a consensus than there is regarding the
need for a systemic regulator. See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-09-216, A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO
MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 52 (2009)
[hereinafter GAO FRAMEWORK], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09216.pdf.
228 Damian Paletta, et al., U.S. Seeks to Stem Bank Fears: White House Plays Down
Nationalization Talk as Stocks Hit New Bear-Market Low, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21,
2009, at Al (noticing that an unnamed source mockingly referred to the policy as
"destructive ambiguity").
229 Litan and Baily, supra note 23.
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considered too big to fail. 23 Of course, identifying the firms the
government regards as essential to the stability of the financial system does
not reveal the circumstance of a rescue or the amount of protection that
uninsured creditors will receive. It does, however, establish a floor under
the identified institutions with respect to their debt issuances that sets them
apart from their competitors.
A latter day variation of the Comptroller's list of eleven banks is
the Fed's list of Large Complex Banking Organizations (LCBO). 231
Though not a public "list" per se, the LCBO program lends itself to rather
precise estimates of the specific firms that are included. 232 According to the
Fed, the LCBO program "is designed to recognize dramatic changes in the
financial, technological, legal, and regulatory environment that necessitate a
flexible supervisory framework." 233 Credit ratings agencies also get into
the act of assessing those firms whose creditors are likely to receive
234government assistance.
Despite all this messaging by official and nonofficial parties, the
Fed showed in 1998 how easily it could be spooked by the possible failure
of a firm that was on no one's TBTF list. Long Term Capital Management
(LTCM) was a firm of only 200 employees but of immense leverage. The
Fed-orchestrated rescue of LTCM demonstrated the fragility of the
financial system and the arbitrariness of the Fed's systemic policy. So
murky was the government's intervention posture vis-et-vis TBTF firms that
even a wizened financial hand, Robert Rubin, was confused. As has been
reported, Mr. Rubin urged a former Treasury colleague to intervene on
behalf of the failing commodities firm and Citigroup customer, Enron,
weeks before its demise. 235 His overture was rebuffed, but the temerity of
its being made is indicative of the elasticity of the TBTF policy even at that
time and even in the mind of one of the custodians of the policy.
The FDIC virtually acknowledges that the uninsured creditors of a
large bank are likely to fare better in a resolution than are uninsured
creditors of small banks. In a large bank resolution, the FDIC typically
uses a bridge-bank to minimize possible spillover effects from the closure.
Large bank systems, particularly the systems of banks that have undergone
significant merger activity, are often incapable of sorting out insured
230 Inquiry into the Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental National Bank:
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. Supervision, Regulation, and Ins. of
the Comm. on Banking, Fin., and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 18-19 (1984)
(statement of Comptroller of the Currency Todd Conover).
231 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., BANK HOLDING COMPANY
SUPERVISION MANUAL § 2124.04 (2005) [hereinafter BHC Manual].
232 Stem & Feldman, supra note 2, at 39.
233 BHC Manual, supra note 231.
234 Stem & Feldman, supra note 2, at 33.
235 Mark Lewis, Rubin Red-Faced Over Enron? Not in the Times, FORBES.COM,
Feb, 11, 2002, http://www.forbes. com/2002/02/11/021 lrubin.html.
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accounts from uninsured accounts, thus tempting the FDIC's invocation of
its "systemic risk" powers to pay off uninsured depositors. As if to remove
any of the ambiguity, the Treasury Department was quite open about the
identities of the nine banks 236 that it invited to a meeting in Washington in
the fall of 2008 and "asked" to accept capital infusions as part of the Capital
Purchase Program.
Several of the reform proposals urge that, going forward, we not
rely on the subtle and not-so-subtle messaging from regulators about which
firms are and are not TBTF. The Group of Thirty, Brookings, and the
Congressional Oversight Panel all call for the identification of TBTF finns
up front. The criteria they would employ in the identification process is a
combination of size, complexity, and interconnectedness. Perhaps the most
extensive list of criteria comes from the Federal Reserve Board staff in
connection with the LCBO program. According to the Fed, measures for
inclusion in the LCBO program include:
• Total assets,
* Size of off-balance sheet exposures,
" Activity in derivatives markets,
* Trading assets and trading revenue,
" Foreign assets and foreign deposits,
" Funding from market (non-deposit) sources,
* Securities borrowed and lent,
" Income from fiduciary activity,
* Mutual fund sales and fee income,
* Revenue earned in mortgage markets,
* Assets under management,
* Activity in payments systems,
* Involvement in securities settlements,
* Geographic scope of operations, and
* Merchant banking activities and proprietary investments. 237
In all likelihood, this list is not exhaustive particularly as it relates only to
banks, and the new order of TBTF will cover nonbanks as well. The list is,
however, illustrative of the capacity of regulators and others to evaluate
236 As the Treasury's action graphically illustrates, it is not just traditional financial
intermediaries such as banks, insurance companies and investment banks that pose
threats to the system. It includes institutions that provide the essential activities of
payments, clearing, settlement and custody for the system such as Bank of New
York Mellon and State Street Corporation. See GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL
REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 17 (2009) [hereinafter Group
of Thirty Framework].
237 Lisa M. DeFerrari & David E. Palmer, Supervision of Large Complex Banking
Organizations, FED. RES. BULL., Feb. 2001, at 502.
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firms based upon specific criteria and that evaluation can inform the
judgment as to the risks those firms pose to themselves and to the system.
Both the evaluation process and the results it produces ought to be
transparent. Defining the TBTF criteria for all to see will accomplish two
objectives. First, it will guide the managements, of those firms that do not
wish to be categorized as TBTF as to how to adjust the scope and scale of
their firms to avoid the designation. Second, it will serve as a roadmap for
the systemic regulator in identifying those firms whose operations, across
the risk spectrum, pose substantial risks to the financial system and to the
real economy. As discussed below, the consequences of this identification
should be considerable, namely, the imposition of a rigorous regulatory
regimen, and a pricing component.
B. Informing on TBTF Firms
As the GAO Report points out, "A regulatory system should focus on
risks to the financial system, not just institutions. ' ' 238  Clearly, the
correlation of risks across institutions and markets will be the task of the
new systemic regulator. Nevertheless, it is widely recognized that the
absence of a mandate placed on any of the financial institution regulators to
monitor for systemic risk arising from the institutions they were charged
with supervising contributed enormously to the current crisis. In the new
order, therefore, it will be incumbent on the systemic regulator to oversee
with intensity the firms it has identified as imposing systemic risk.
As Litan and Baily have observed, there are two pillars to a stable
financial system: market discipline and sound regulation. 239 During the
Clinton and Bush administrations, excessive reliance was placed on market
discipline at the expense of sound regulation. 240 In truth, both pillars,
regulation and market discipline, need to be strengthened in recognition that
both failed in the current crisis. Meanwhile, echoes of the ancien regime
are still heard extolling the supremacy of market discipline over sound
regulation. 241 These voices need to be discounted in light of current events.
For those few firms that will be defined as posing systemic risks,
the bias of policy makers should be in the direction of sound regulation.
Firms posing systemic risks are, by definition, threats not just to
themselves, their shareholders, and their creditors, but to others as well.
The socialization of those risks needs to be minimized beyond the
capability of market forces. Also, the magnitude of the collateral damage to
238 GAO Framework, supra note 227, at 52.
239 Litan and Baily, supra note 23, at 7.
240 Id. at 9.
241 See generally Peter J. Wallison, Regulation without Reason: The Group of
Thirty Report, FIN. SERV. OUTLOOK, Jan. 28, 2009. Mr. Wallison is a former
general counsel of the Treasury Department.
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the economy, arising from the meltdown of such firms warrants a firmer
hand on their operations.
An era of profligate bailouts has released a genie that will be
difficult to return to his lamp. Even before the events of 2008, a host of
factors created a climate of moral hazard that encouraged excessive risk
taking and systemic leverage on an unsustainable scale. One legacy of the
casual bailout is the disruption of the normal flow of credit. Until such time
as lenders and counterparties can extend credit without the distorting effects
of a perceived government subsidy, it will be important for the systemic
regulator to ingratiate itself with systemically significant firms.
The tools for this process are familiar, though many need to be
enhanced in light of lessons learned from the current crisis:




" Eliminating perverse compensation incentives
" Continuous monitoring by on-site examiners.242
To augment these traditional regulatory methods, other approaches have
been suggested, such as scenario planning and enhanced Prompt Corrective
Action (PCA). 243 Scenario planning refers to a process of examination by
which regulators attempt to determine the spillover effect of one firm's
failure on other institutions and the development of plans for addressing the
failure of large banks. 244 In general, enhanced PCA contemplates utilizing
the enforcement methodology of FDICIA that ratchets up the regulatory
pressure on banks as their capital levels decline, but with the added measure
that capital levels are determined on a more forward looking basis. 245
Another suggestion for the regulation of TBTF firms is requiring
them to issue a percentage of assets in the form of long-term, subordinated
debt instruments possibly convertible into equity. 246 In theory, the market
discipline of debt holders who do not benefit from enhanced earnings of the
firms, whose long-term debt they hold, will temper the risk appetite of
TBTF firms. Similarly, the pricing of such debt in the market could serve
as an additional gauge for the regulator as to the health of the TBTF firm.
242 As recommended by the Group of Thirty and the Brookings Institute. See
Group of Thirty Framework, supra note 236, at 12; see LITAN AND BAILY, supra
note 23, at 11. Capital requirements can be made counter-cyclical by requiring
regulated firms to augment capital during periods of relative stability.
243 See Stern & Feldman, supra note 2, at 7, 10.
244 id.
2451 Id. at 10, 11.
246 Litan and Baily, supra note 23, at 11.
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The Financial Stability Forum 247  has recommended the
establishment of a "college of supervisors" for each of the largest global
financial institutions. 248 Although the composition and the mandate of these
colleges have yet to be determined, 4 9 the concept of having a team focused
on firm-wide risk management and cross-border liquidity is valid. For
TBTF firms that are global in their reach, as most will be, international
supervisory information sharing and cooperation will be essential.
Another possibility is the establishment of "public interest"
directorships on the boards of directors of TBTF firms. The author has
argued for some time that, in exchange for their substantial equity
infusions, taxpayers deserve board representation to oversee their
considerable investments in large banks. 250 The notion of public interest
directors is a well developed one as, for example, each of the twelve
Federal Home Loan Banks is required to have several such directors. Like
other so-called "constituency" directors, the role of the public interest
directors would be to represent both the shareholders and the taxpayers.
The regulator of the TBTF firm has a different mandate than does a
prudential regulator. The systemic regulator must: first, minimize the
possibility of a TBTF firm imploding; and, second, establish procedures
and standards that will minimize the spillover effect from a TBTF firm's
failure. To accomplish the first goal, a combination of traditional and
innovative regulatory methods, as described above, should be applied to
TBTF firms. Success in accomplishing the second goal of reducing
spillover effects from TBTF events will, in time, reduce the number of
TBTF firms.
C. Pricing
Finally, we now come to the essential and the defining point of the
way forward in financial regulation. As observed, many of the reports and
studies agree on the dual notions of identifying TBTF firms and regulating
them with intensity. What they have avoided is the essential component:
recapturing for the taxpayer the financial benefit taxpayers confer on TBTF
247 The Financial Stability Forum, housed and supported by the Bank for
International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland, brings together senior representatives
of national financial authorities (e.g. central banks, supervisory authorities and
treasury departments), international financial institutions, international regulatory
and supervisory groupings, committees of central bank experts and the European
Central Bank, to promote international financial stability through information
exchange and international co-operation in financial supervision and surveillance.
248 FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM
ON ENHANCING MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE 4 (Apr. 7, 2008).
249 Id. at 42.
250 Cornelius Hurley, We Have Equity, Now Give us Oversight, AM. BANKER, Oct.
28, 2008, at 10.
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firms in the form of an implicit guarantee of the firms' debt. Without this
pricing adjustment, the moral hazard genie is free to do more damage.
The TARP Congressional Oversight Panel's majority report 25 1
regrettably muddies the waters on this issue; however, the minority
252
report manages to put it back in focus. Under its list of "Critical Problems"
in need of resolution, the majority, with seeming boldness, titles its first
recommendation "Identify and Regulate Financial Institutions that Pose
Systemic Risk." 253 In its narrative, however, the majority pulls its punch by
saying what it really meant by identifying institutions was to "...identify
the degree of systemic risk posed by financial institutions, products, and
markets..." 254 This is a far cry from identifying specific institutions. The
minority, however, responds with considerable clarity by frontally
addressing the issue of pricing for TBTF identified firms:
In the alternative case, the market may view designation
[as TBTF] as a defacto guarantee of public support in [sic]
during times of financial stress. The firm attains a
beneficial market status, and enjoys advantages such as a
lower cost of capital in the public markets. The costs of
failure are thus socialized, while profits remain in private
hands (much as was the case for the GSEs, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac). Recent events make clear that this scenario
is perhaps an even more undesirable outcome than the
former. 255
As the minority correctly points out, we need to learn from the
failed Fannie/Freddie business model of socializing risk and privatizing
reward. Regrettably, the events of 2008 have extended that business model
to Citigroup, Bank of America, AIG, etc., at least with respect to their
uninsured creditors. Charging TBTF firms for the value of their funding
subsidy would compensate the taxpayer and ensure that the risk of TBTF
firms is not socialized. Call the charge a premium, a tax, or a surcharge as
you will; it will, in every instance, dissuade firms from the headlong pursuit
of the TBTF business model. This rather modest public policy action will
restore equilibrium to our financial market by removing the distortive
effects of the implicit federal subsidy of large and complex firms.
Combined with the intense regulation of TBTF firms, this regimen will
minimize, but not eliminate, the possibility of firm failure.
251 Congressional Oversight Panel supra note 22, at 22.
252 Minority members of the Panel are Cong. Jeb Hensarling and former Sen. John
E. Sununu.
253 Congressional Oversight Panel, supra note 22, at 22.
254 Id.
2551d. at 87.
Paying the Price for Too Big to Fail
And what is the price that TBTF firms pay for their status? Quite
simply, it is the delta between the funding costs of non-TBTF firms and
those of TBTFs. Once more, the GSE experience should be instructive.
VIII. CONCLUSION
An inherent tension of our system of prudential regulation is the
tolerance for risk and bank failure. For all the obeisance to safety and
soundness as a guiding principle of bank regulation, it is recognized that
some banks will and should fail. It is axiomatic that a system so restrictive
as to eliminate the risk of failure would also stifle the risk of innovation. It
is also well settled that the losses arising from a bank's failure should be
borne by its stakeholders, and not by innocent third parties, or by the
financial system in general.
The TBTF firm presents the compelling case where failure cannot
occur without losses being imposed system-wide on stakeholders and on
non-stakeholders. Like the poor, we will always have TBTF firms with us.
The symbiotic relationship between TBTF firms and the financial system
needs to be recognized, and the price advantage that accrues to such firms
as a result of the public subsidy needs to be recouped. Doing so will,
among other things, retard the pursuit of corporate gigantism that has
characterized the last three decades of free market exuberance and
encourage more competitive markets.
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